I study the impact of immigration and ethnic diversity on political outcomes in immigrantreceiving countries, focusing on the case of election outcomes and immigration in Danish municipalities . A rich set of control variables isolates ethnic diversity effects from that of other immigrant characteristics and a novel IV strategy based on historical housing stock data addresses issues of endogenous location choice of immigrants. Immigration-driven increases in ethnic diversity improve electoral outcomes for anti-immigrant nationalist parties.
This paper studies the impact of immigration and ethnic diversity on political outcomes. Both anecdotal evidence and existing work on ethnic diversity offer good reasons to expect that the arrival of immigrants and the associated increases in ethnic diversity may have a causal effect on politics. Perhaps the most striking piece of anecdotal evidence comes from recent European history: While immigration flows into Europe have risen dramatically over the last 30 years leading to large increases in ethnic diversity, European politics is viewed by many to to have taken a systematic rightward turn, fueled in large part by increased success of many anti-immigrant nationalist parties. 1 Beyond anecdote, much existing work in economics have already documented a cross-sectional relationship between ethnic diversity and political preferences as well as political outcomes.
This paper asks whether there are causal underpinnings to the observed phenomena described above, that is, whether the mere presence of immigrants has a causal effect on political leanings.
In particular I examine whether immigration-driven increases in ethnic diversity have systematic effects on overall left-right politics and whether they lead to increased success for anti-immigrant nationalist parties. If increasing ethnic diversity alters the political balance between the "big government" left wing and "small government" right wing, immigration may have important, indirect public finance implications by systematically impacting the level of redistribution or public spending. If immigration by itself also causes a surge in nationalism this may put an upper bound on the amount of immigration that is feasible before anti-immigration sentiments begin to dominate politically.
I examine the specific case of Danish election outcomes and immigration in Danish municipalities 1981 Danish municipalities -2001 . The Danish immigration experience over the last 30 years is very similar to that of the rest of Europe. In 1981, the yearly net migration to Denmark from non-Western countries was just over 1,000 per year. Twenty years later, in 2001, this number had increased more than tenfold to 11,000, resulting in a corresponding increase in the stock of non-Western immigrants in Denmark from 55,000 to 269,000 -almost a fivefold increase in just 20 years. The increased immigration flows were not distributed evenly, however, resulting in very significant variation in the growth of ethnic diversity. While some municipalities experienced increases in the share of immigrants in the population of well over ten percentage points, others experienced essentially no change at all. Combined with the high-level of political autonomy of Danish municipalities, this makes the Danish setting well-suited for examining the ethnic diversity effects of immigration on political outcomes.
I presents results from regressions of changes in election outcomes on changes in the immigrant share in the municipality and focus on changes in the relative success of the traditional "big government" left-wing and "small government" right-wing parties as well as the the particular success of right-wing, anti-immigrant nationalists. In addition to controlling for time-invariant municipality attributes through first-differencing, I employ a rich set of controls to isolate the effects of ethnic diversity. In particular, a set of socioeconomic controls addresses the possibility that immigration affects political preferences simply because immigrants and refugees are poorer or because they adversely affect local labor market conditions. Empirical studies of immigration have obvious endogeneity concerns, given that immigrants themselves choose where to live. To address this I develop a novel IV strategy based on the availability of historical housing stock data and an institutional constraint that forces foreigners to live in rental housing for the first five years they are in Denmark. Since highrises are much more likely to serve as rental housing and since the composition of the housing stock is very persistent over time, I use the share of the 1970 housing stock comprised by highrises as an instrument for later immigration flows. The underlying identifying assumption is that the characteristics of the 1970 housing stock have no direct effect on changes in election outcomes between conditional on appropriate controls.
The main IV results confirm that immigration-driven increases in ethnic diversity have a causal impact on political outcomes. Higher ethnic diversity increases political support for anti-immigrant nationalist parties in municipal elections, with estimates suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the share of immigrants increases the percentage of nationalist seats on the municipal board by between 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points. For other parties, the effect of ethnic diversity is somewhat imprecisely estimated, however, the increased success for the right-wing nationalists parties comes primarily at the expense of traditional left-wing parties, implying that increases in ethnic diversity overall shifts political power towards the right-wing block. There are also some indications that ethnic diversity may have a small negative effect on political support for traditional right-wing parties that lack strong anti-immigrant nationalist positions, although this effect is generally not statistically significant. Interestingly, the effect of immigration on national election outcomes is almost identical to the effect on municipal elections, despite the very different political issues decided at the two levels of government. This could suggest that the effect is caused by an overall shift in "ideology" and not driven by particular political issues. Finally, a comparison of IV and OLS estimates suggests that endogenous location choice of immigrants causes an overall pro-left bias in OLS estimates. This is consistent with existing evidence on immigrant location choice in Denmark. This paper is directly related to existing work in economics that establishes a cross-sectional relationship between ethnic diversity, political attitudes and political outcomes. Luttmer (2001) and Senik et al. (2009) , for example, find evidence that support for welfare spending is negatively related to local ethnic diversity in both the US General Social Survey and the European Social Survey. A negative cross-sectional relationship between ethnic diversity and the level of public spending or public goods have also been found by several authors both at the country level (Easterly and Levine (1997) , Easterly (2001) , Alesina et al. (2001) , Alesina et al. (2003) and Lassen (2007) ) within developing countries (Miguel and Gugerty (2005) , Banerjee et al. (2005) and Okten and Osili (2004) ) and within developed countries (Alesina et al. (1999) and Vigdor (2004) ).
In contrast to the large body of cross-sectional evidence, however, relatively few papers examine the effects of immigration and the resulting changes in ethnic diversity over time. Albeit not focusing specifically on ethnic diversity, Razin et al. (2002) and Mayr and Böheim (2005) both find negative effects of immigration on the size of the public sector using panels of countries.
Neither paper is able to fully address the issue of immigrant location choice, however. More narrowly focused on ethnic diversity is Zwane and Sunding (2006) which looks at the effect of immigration on the size of the public sector in California and uses an IV-strategy based on the Immigration Reform and Control Act. They find a negative effect of immigration on various measures of public spending, however, the employed instrument is plagued by a weak first stage.
Closest to the work presented here are recent papers by Gerdes and Wadensjö (2010) and Gerdes (2011) as well as concurrent work by Dahlberg et al. (2011) . Like the present paper Gerdes and Wadensjö (2010) and Gerdes (2011) focus on Danish municipalities and examine the effect of immigration on political outcomes. Their empirical strategy differs fundamentally from that of the current paper, however, since they assume that the number of immigrants in a municipality is exogenuous (conditional on controls) due to a refugee placement policy that aimed to secure an equal division of refugees across municipalities. Their empirical strategy is thus vulnerable to endogenous relocation choices of immigrants not covered by the placement policy as well as political discretion in how the placement policy was implemented. This may explain why they fail to find the systematic effects of immigration on left-right politics that I find in the present paper. 2
The concurrent work by Dahlberg et al. (2011) focuses instead on Swedish municipalities and employ survey data regarding preferences for redistribution. Their empirical strategy also relies on a refugee placement policy but circumvents the issues of relocation by immigrants not covered by the policy by using the actual number of placed refugees as an instrument. In line with the present papers results regarding left-wing political support, Dahlberg et al. (2011) , find that ethnic diversity lowers self-reported support for redistributive policies. The present paper complements this result by showing the effect of immigration on actual voting outcomes and by employing a different empirical strategy that does not rely on a refugee placement policy and therefore, in particular, is also robust to political discretion in the implementation of refugee placement.
The layout of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section 1 presents the details of the institutional setting, section 2 presents the data and discusses the empirical strategy, section 3 present the empirical results regarding the effect of ethnic diversity on election outcomes and section 4 concludes.
Institutional details of the Danish setting
A few specific features of the Danish context will be important for the empirical analysis: 1) Knowledge of the political landscape will help in interpreting the election results and 2) understanding the sources of variation in migration and ethnic diversity across municipalities is crucial for assessing the identification assumptions. This section gives a brief overview of these features of the Danish context.
The Danish political landscape
At the national level, the Danish political system is a unicameral parliamentary system. Parliamentary elections are held at the discretion of the government but at least every four years. As is typical in many European countries, Denmark has a multitude of political parties and minority coalition governments are the norm, with power held by a stable group of several smaller parties.
There are two very stable groups that either form governments together or act as supporting parties for minority governments: a left-wing "big-government" group led by the social democratic party (Socialdemokraterne) and a right-wing "small-government" 3 group, currently led by the free-market liberals (Venstre).
At the municipal level, each municipality is governed by a municipal board of varying size, which is chosen in a direct election every four years. Due to the high level of political autonomy of Danish municipalities, the municipal board wields considerable power and is for example responsible for determining the level of the municipal income tax rate. While only Danish citizens can vote in the national parliamentary elections, non-nationalized immigrants and refugees can also vote in municipal elections after being in Denmark for 2-3 years. They generally have lower turnout, however (see for example Togeby (1999) ).
Overall, municipal politics mirror those at the national level. While local party lists do field candidates and win seats in some areas, the majority of seats are won by the parties that are also active at the national level. Some deviations between the local and national political platform do exist for these parties, 4 however, the political platform of the national party remains a good approximation of the political position of the local branch. In particular, the picture of one leftwing and one right-wing group continues to hold at the municipal level. To shed light on whether and how ethnic diversity affects left-right politics, the empirical analysis in section 3 thus examines how the relative success of these two groups changes in response to immigration.
The second part of my empirical analysis concerns the effect of immigration on the politi-3 Here and throughout the paper, terms such as "left", "right", "big-government" and "small-government" are used relative to Danish politics, which are overall very leftist compared to other countries. From a US perspective, for example, the Danish parties that I refer to as being right-wing would most likely be viewed as being extremely leftist.
4 For the present paper, a particularly relevant example of this is the very clear anti-immigrant sentiments expressed by many social-democrats in the municipalities surrounding Copenhagen in the early 1990s, which raise some concerns about blindly identifying local party positions with that of the national parties. Part of the motivation for examining national elections as well as municipal elections is that idiosyncrasies in local party platforms should be much smaller in national elections. Dansk Folkeparti maintained Fremskridtspartiet's anti-immigrant sentiments as a central element and was initially viewed as almost an exact copy of its predecessor party. Given the focus of the present paper, however, it is interesting to note that Dansk Folkeparti has since taken up a very different rhetoric regarding the size of the public sector and has to some extent actually branded themselves as pro-government. At the same time, however, it has continued to act unequivocally as part of the right-wing political group and was the main supporting party for the right-wing coalition government that served between 2001 and 2011. While it is thus clear that increased nationalist success implies a tilting of political power towards the right-wing block, some caution is warranted in simply equating this with a change in political attitudes towards less support for the public sector. 5
Sources of variation in immigration and ethnic diversity
The Danish immigration experience is very similar to that of other European countries. Largescale immigration from non-western countries was encouraged and took off in the late 1960s in response to strong economic growth and a shortage of labor. Following the economic slowdown in the 1970s, however, immigration rules were quickly tightened. Since 1973 Denmark has thus had an "immigration stop" policy in effect, which as a rule of thumb has prevented new immigration.
However, three channels have continued the migration-driven increase in ethnic diversity over the 5 In particular, it has been argued that increased support for anti-immigrant policies may indirectly lead to more right-wing economic policies even if people's attitudes towards the public sector are unchanged. This is what Lee and Roemer (2006) term a "policy bundling" effect. These findings have several implications for the empirical analysis in the present paper: The first point implies that (as with the fertility and reunification channel) the existing stock of immigrants and refugees should be an important predictor of later inflows and thus might be an important control in the empirical analysis because initial settlement patterns of immigrants could be proxying for a host of possible confounders. Similarly points two and three suggest two additional controls for the empirical analysis.
The fourth point reflects the fact that by law non-Nordic citizens are unable to own real estate until they have lived in Denmark for at least five years, making the availability of rental housing a main determinant of refugee settlement. This fact will form the basis for the IV strategy discussed in section 2 below.
Finally points five and six imply that reverse causality can be an issue in the empirical analysis if refugees are likely to move away from areas cutting back on educational efforts or even more worryingly, move directly in response to changes the political climate. The IV strategy developed below will be key in assessing and addressing potential reverse causality concerns.
Data and empirical strategy
In this section I first present the data used in the paper. I then present the empirical specification and discusses identification issues. Finally I discuss the paper's IV strategy in detail.
Data
The municipal level data for my empirical analysis are all based on the administrative data at Statistics Denmark (SD), with most variables from the publicly available Statistikbanken database.
The only exception to this is the municipal-level vote shares for national elections. These vote shares were instead collected from the election accounts of the Danish Ministry of the Interior. 7
Out of the 275 Danish municipalities, I drop the two very populuous and urban Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities since these had a dual role as both counties and municipalities at the time and thus had a markedly different set of political tasks (in particular counties were responsible for the provision of public health). 8 This leaves me with a sample of 273 municipalities. group, which consists of any parties not assigned to the groups above. The "other" group thus consists of all the local party lists as well as the most centrist parties from the national political stage, which either were not part of any governments over the sample period or were part of both a left and a right-wing government.
The income data I use is denominated in 1,000 kr. and deflated to 1980 prices using the (chain-linked) GDP deflator from the Danish national accounts.
For the historical housing stock data used in the IV estimation, the use of the term "1970 housing stock" is actually a slight misnomer since the variable only includes housing constructed 
Specification and identification issues
In discussing the empirical strategy, I begin with a linear expression relating election outcomes to ethnic diversity. Ignoring for now the possibility of adding control variables we can thus write:
Here i indexes municipalities and t indexes time period. The parameter of interest is β, which is defined to be the causal effect of immigration-driven ethnic diversity on election outcomes. In addition, κ is a common intercept, µ i is a municipality-specific fixed effect, α is a common trend, η i is a municipality-specific trend and ν it is the effect of all time varying factors affecting the outcome of interest.
Equation (1) above will be estimated in differences using two years of data (in most cases 1981
and 2001). The use of a "long difference" specification involving only the change between two time periods allows for flexibility in the exact timing of effects, and further differences out any time-invariant municipal effects. Given the very high autocorrelation of the variables used in the estimation, the long difference approach also sidesteps issues with estimating standard errors in the face of autocorrelation. 11
Letting t = 1 denote the base year, t = 2 the end year and letting ∆ denote the difference between these two years, we can thus difference (1), which yields the basic estimating equation:
A major concern for identification is the possibility of reverse causality as a result of immigrants' relocation decisions. As discussed in section 1, immigrants are known to move away from areas with right-wing political domination, so a particular concern is that immigrants respond to rightward shifts in election outcomes by moving to different municipalities. For OLS estimates this could cause a very significant bias in the direction of finding a positive association between percentage immigrants and left-wing political success. The next subsection develops an IV strategy, which will be used to address the issue of endogenous relocation decisions of immigrants.
Another obvious concern stems from the fact that higher ethnic diversity in the sample is directly related to having more immigrants, which might have a direct impact on election outcomes beyond any ethnic diversity effects. In (2) this would imply a correlation between these omitted time varying factors, ∆ν i and any relevant instrument (that is any instrument that affects the number of immigrants). Of particular concern, since immigrants tend to be poorer, have higher unemployment rates and lower labor force participation, are the separate effects of lower income, higher unemployment and lower labor force participation. 12 In the same vein, one may also worry that immigration adversely impacts the local labor market also for natives, which might affect political preferences. In the empirical analysis I address these concerns by examining the robustness of the estimated effect to the inclusion of a control vector, ∆X i , which measures changes in a rich set of socioeconomic indicators, including mean income, fraction not in the workforce, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, and fraction receiving income transfers.
Relatedly, the fact that immigrants can vote in municipal elections after 2-3 years implies that having more immigrants can affect election outcomes directly (again introducing correlation between the ethnic diversity measure and ∆ν i ) simply because immigrants tend to vote differently than natives. This problem cannot be addressed by including additional controls or by the IV strategy discussed below; however, in practice the resulting bias in estimates should be relatively small, especially given the lower election turnout among immigrants. Additionally, since immigrants are generally left-leaning politically 13 the direction of the bias most likely goes in the direction of finding a positive association between percentage immigrants and left-wing political success. 14 Finally, correlation between the employed instrument and the municipality specific trend, η i , is a concern. In the empirical analysis I address this concern by examining the robustness of the estimated effect to including a control vector Z i1 containing different initial characteristics of the municipality which might correlate with the municipal trend. In particular I examine the robustness of the estimated effects to controlling for how urban a municipality is initially, its initial income level and its initial level of ethnic diversity. 15
With the two control vectors, ∆X i and Z i1 , (and with a slight abuse of notation), we arrive at the final estimating equation:
The next section develops the IV strategy that will be used to estimate (3).
The IV strategy
The fact that non-Nordic citizens cannot own real estate during their first five years in Denmark implies that availability of rental housing is a major predictor of the location choice of immigrants.
This suggests using the initial amount of rental housing in a municipality as an instrument for the change in percentage non-Danish. Identification would then rest on the exclusion restriction that any association between initial rental housing and changes in the outcomes of interest is exclusively due to changes in the percentage non-Danish so that initial rental housing is uncorrelated with the composite error term η i + ∆ν i in equation (3).
Because property owners are fairly free to choose between renting out their property and selling the property to would-be occupants, however, this exclusion restriction seems likely to fail. The most obvious problem is that the share of rental housing could respond to expectations about future political outcomes and how they will affect the profitability of renting versus owning.
To circumvent problems with using actual rental housing as an instrument I will instead utilize detailed data on the historical housing stock and the fact that (for obvious reasons) housing stock characteristics are very persistent over time. Combining this with the fact that highrises are much more likely to serve as rental housing, suggests using the historical prevalence of highrises as an instrument. Thus the IV strategy will entail using the share of the 1970 housing stock that is comprised by highrise homes as an instrument for later changes in the percentage non-Danish (with the association working through the availability of rental housing during the sample period
1981-2001).
With the slightly abusive notation that t = 0 denotes 1970, equation (4) introduces the first stage relationship corresponding to IV estimation of (3). Figure 1 also provides a schematic illustration of the principle behind the IV strategy:
Using the historical housing stock as the instrument makes the exclusion restriction much more plausible especially due to the introduced time distance between the period of interest and the dating of the instrument (1970, which in particular is before the inflow of immigrants to Denmark had taken off). For example, one concern with using higrises as an instrument is that highrises might affect the population composition also among natives, which could obviously have a direct effect on election outcomes. Under the reasonable assumption that any effect of the housing stock on population composition does not work with a lag of more than ten years, however, the effect of the 1970 housing stock on population composition would be fully reflected in the 1981 population. From the point of view of the sample period, this is a fixed municipality characteristic and is captured by the municipality fixed effect, µ i which has been differenced out in the final estimating equation. Such population composition effects thus do not violate the exclusion restriction that the 1970 housing stock is uncorrelated with the composite error term in (3), which only contains η i and ∆ν i .
Some concerns with the instruments remain, however. One is that the number of highrises might simply proxy for how urban a municipality is and only predicts immigrant settlement because immigrants were more likely to settle in urban areas. In table 4 below I show that this is not the case. Another concern is that there might be mean reversion in the instrument implying that a large share of highrises in 1970 might imply larger increases in the share of other kinds of housing later and thus attract different kinds of people during the sample period, which would show up in ∆ν i . There are only modest indications of mean reversion in highrise share in the data, however, and the estimates presented later in the paper are robust to controlling for the change in highrise share over the sample period.
Finally, as noted before, differences in pre-existing trends between municipalities (differences in η i ) that relate systematically to the housing stock are a concern. As discussed above, I attempt to address this by probing the robustness of my results to the inclusion of a control vector of various initial municipal characteristics (Z i1 ). For completeness, however, figure 2 in the supplementary appendix also splits the sample of municipalities in two groups according to the 1970 highrise share and plots difference in ethnic diversity and election outcomes between the two groups over time. Unfortunately, the smooth evolution of ethnic diversity over time combined with the fact that election outcomes are noisy and only observed every 4 years implies that relatively little is learned from this empirical exercise.
As always with just-identified IV, the exclusion restriction discussed above is ultimately untestable.
The hypothesized first stage relationship between variables shown in figure 1 and equation (4), however, can be examined. Table 4 housing predicts later changes in ethnic diversity. Column three adds controls for initial population size and density to address the concern that the relationship between the variables is just working through urban/rural differences. The robustness of the positive relationship to the added controls shows that this is not the case. Column four adds the instrument to the regression and its slightly negative and insignificant coefficient shows that once the initial rental share is accounted for, the 1970 housing stock does not predict changes in percentage non-Danish.
Finally columns five and six correspond to equation (4), the first stage of the IV-estimation.
Change in percentage non-Danish is regressed on the highrise instrument and (possibly) controls.
The positive and significant relationship indicates that the instrument satisfies the rank condition, also when population size and density are included as controls. The F-statistic for testing the significance of the instrument is reported at the bottom to gauge the strength of the instrument (as proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) ). Using the usual "rule of thumb", neither column shows any indications of weak instrument problems since the F-statistics are both well above 10 (although, as is evidenced by the large drop in the F-statistic between the two columns, the inclusion of controls does significantly reduce the power of the instrument). As a further check against weak instrument bias I have also performed "weak instrument"-robust Anderson-Rubin tests for the significance of all the paper's IV estimates. The results of these tests are identical to the results obtained in section 3 using standard inference.
Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results. I present the main results of the paper regarding the outcomes of municipal elections first using OLS and then using IV estimation. I then turn to additional results from national elections. respectively and an increase in the percentage of seats held by nationalists and the "other" group of 0.920 and 0.888. All of these effects are statistically significant at the 1% level except for the "other" group, which is only significant at the 5% level.
Results for municipal elections using OLS
In column two, the changes in the set of socioeconomic indicators are added as controls. This causes the estimated effect for both the left and the "other" group to change to slightly positive and insignificant at 0.153 and 0.130 respectively. The positive effect for nationalists is halved but remains highly significant, while the negative effect for the non-nationalist right wing also drops in magnitude to -0.769 and becomes insignificant due to an increase in the standard error. This suggests that much of the strong raw correlations stems from ethnic diversity being correlated with overall socioeconomic outcomes (either because immigrants affect average overall outcomes directly or because of the endogenous location choice of immigrants).
Next, columns three, four and five examine concerns regarding differential trends between municipalities by including various initial municipality characteristics that might correlate with municipal trends in election outcomes. Since immigrants are known to be more likely to settle in big urban municipalities, column three controls for the initial (1981) population size and density to address the possibility of differential trends between urban and rural areas. Compared to column one this is seen to make the estimated effect for the left disappear almost completely, while increasing the magnitude of the effect for the non-nationalist right wing to -1.450 and slightly decreasing the magnitude of the positive effect for the nationalists to 0.684 but leaving both effects highly significant. The estimated effect for the "other" group is left almost unchanged but due to a larger standard error its significance is lowered.
Column four instead adds the initial mean income in the municipality as a control to address the possibility of differential trends between initially high versus low-income municipalities. This gives estimated effects that are almost identical to the previous column. Column five controls for the initial percentage non-Danish in the municipality as this is known to be a predictor of immigrant location choice and may also correlate with municipality trends. Again results are very close to those obtained in column 3, although the estimated effect for both the left and the "other" group and are slightly larger in magnitude.
Finally, column six of the table includes both the socioeconomic controls (as in column two) and the initial population size and population density (as in column three). With the exception of the left group, where the estimated effect increases somewhat, this leads to estimates that all fall roughly in between the estimates obtained when the two set of controls were included separately.
Estimates behave similarly in specifications with other combinations of the employed controls.
As mentioned in section 2, the possibility that immigrants move in response to election outcomes implies that OLS estimates are likely to biased. If we take the estimates at face value, however, they overall suggest that an increase in ethnic diversity corresponding to a one percentage point increase in the percentage non-Danish has a significant negative impact on the percentage of seats held by the non-nationalist right of around 1.0 percentage point, while it has a significant positive effect on the fraction of seats held by nationalists of between 0.5 and 0.9 percentage point. For both the left wing and the "other" group, there is no clear effect of an increase in ethnic diversity, although there are some indications of a positive effect for the "other" group.
Results for municipal elections using IV
As discussed in section 1 there is evidence that refugees in Denmark prefer not to live in right-wing dominated municipalities, which suggests that immigrants might be moving away from municipalities where the right gains politically. To address the resulting issue of reverse causality, and bias in the OLS estimates, I repeat my analysis using the highrise share of the 1970 housing stock as an instrument. Table 6 shows the results.
The difference between OLS and IV are very much in line with expectations given the discussion of reverse causality. The small and insignificant effect for the left wing suggested by the OLS estimates is replaced by large and significant negative effects in all six specifications, ranging from -1.775 to -5.297 (although increases in standard errors as controls are added imply that significance is only at the 10% level in three of the specifications with controls). The negative and significant effect for the non-nationalist right-wing is replaced by insignificant estimates in all specifications and the positive effect of around half a percent for the nationalist are replaced by larger estimates in all specifications, which are all highly signficant even with larger standard errors implied by the use of IV. 16
Looking more closely at the IV estimates, a couple of additional points are worth noting:
While IV estimates of the effect for the non-nationalist right wing generally are smaller in magnitude than the OLS estimates, the difference is not that big and the lack of significance is in large part just due to the larger standard errors. It thus seems premature to conclude that there is no negative effect for the non-nationalist right group once reverse causality bias is accounted for.
For the "other" group, IV estimates seem to fairly clearly suggest a sizable positive effect, with the estimated effect being large and positive throughout and significant in four of the six 16 As for the OLS estimates, specifications employing different combinations of controls give results that are similar to the ones presented. When both changes in socioeconomic indicators and initial mean income are included as controls, however, the estimated effect for the left group becomes insignificant despite being relatively relatively large in magnitude (the point estimate is -1.392).
specifications. Examing more disaggregated election outcome data shows that this positive effect is being driven by positive effects for independent, local party lists in some municipalities. Since their political platforms cannot be determined, the positive effect for the "other" group is thus hard to interpret.
Summing up, the results are very much consistent with reverse causality leading to "pro left-wing" bias in the OLS-estimates. Based on the IV estimates, increasing ethnic diversity clearly has a large and positive effect on nationalist political support. The estimated effect of a one percentage point increase in ethnic diversity ranges between about 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points more nationalist seats on the municipal board. For the non-nationalist right-wing and leftwing parties, estimates are somewhat imprecise but always show a large and at least marginally significant negative effect on the left wing. There are however also persistent indications of a smaller negative effect on the non-nationalist right wing, although this effect is never statistically significant. Comparing tables 7 and 8 to tables 5 and 6, the first difference one notices is that larger standard errors make most coefficients insignificant in tables 7 and 8, which is likely due to the loss of variation with the shorter time period. The pattern of results are otherwise very similar:
Results for national elections
Moderately positive OLS estimates for the nationalists are replaced by larger positive effects when using IV estimation and significant negative OLS estimates for the non-nationalist right wing are replaced by insignificant IV estimates which are smaller in magnitude. As before, insignificant OLS estimates for the left wing also decrease to become relatively consistently negative when IV is employed. The main differences in estimates seem to be that effects are generally estimated to be smaller in magnitude 18 in tables 7 and 8 and that both OLS and IV estimates for the left wing are more positive (to the extent that OLS estimates in table 7 actually show a consistent positive effect for the left wing).
Thus, while the large standard errors in tables 7 and 8 suggest that some caution is warranted, the tables overall suggest that that the effects of ethnic diversity on municipal elections are com- Looking at tables 9 and 10, the first thing to note is that both OLS and IV estimates are much more precise here than in all the previous tables, which increases significance throughout.
This likely reflects the fact that idiosyncrasies in local party positions introduce additional noise when considering municipal elections and thereby increase standard errors. The next thing to note is that the estimated effects for national elections show exactly the same pattern as for municipal elections: OLS estimates show a negative and significant effect on the non-nationalist 17 By using data on vote shares (which are avaiable for municipal elections from 1989 onwards), this also allows me to establish that the previous results regarding seat shares are not driven by differences in the total number of seats across municipal boards or are an artifact of how seats are allocated from actual voting results.
18 Obviously, the dependent variable is also different between the two sets of tables since one considers vote shares and the other seat shares. These two variables should track each other quite closely, however.
right wing group, a positive and mostly significant effect on nationalists and no systematic effects for the left wing. When switching to IV these estimates are replaced by a sizable and significant negative effect on the left wing, a larger and more significant effect for the nationalists and a fairly consistently negative but insignificant effect for the non-nationalist right wing. Finally, it is also worth noting that the consistently positive and significant effect found in IV estimates for the "other" group when considering municipal elections does not carry over to the IV estimates for national elections. This confirms that increased success of local party lists are driving the results for the "other" group in municipal elections.
Overall, the effects of ethnic diversity on voting patterns thus do not seem to differ between municipal and national elections. Given the very different issues decided at the two levels of government, this may be somewhat surprising. One interpretation of this result is that the effect of local ethnic diversity on voting is not driven by a particular policy issue but rather by more fundamental changes in preferences or "ideology", or perhaps by increases in the salience of ethnic diversity.
Conclusion
The present paper provides evidence on how immigration and increasing ethnic diversity affects political outcomes in immigrant-receiving countries by undertaking a case study of immigration and election outcomes in Danish municipalities . A rich set of control variables isolates ethnic diversity effects from the effect of other immigrant characteristics and a novel IV strategy based on historical housing stock data addresses issues of endogenous location choice of immigrants. The paper's results confirm that immigration-driven increases in ethnic diversity have systematic effects on political outcomes. Increasing ethnic diversity has a significant positive effect on the electoral success of anti-immigrant nationalist parties. This increased success comes primarily at the expenses of traditional left-wing parties but possibly also at the expense of the non-nationalist right-wing parties, with estimates being somewhat imprecise. Since the nationalist parties vote with the rest of the right wing, however, the overall effect of ethnic diversity on left-right politics is clearly to tilt the balance of power towards the right-wing block. Finally, the effects of ethnic diversity on election outcomes are found to be virtually identical when comparing national and municipal elections in spite of the very different sets of issues decided at these two levels of government. This could suggest that the effect of ethnic diversity might not be driven by particular political issues but rather a more fundamental shift in preferences or "ideology".
These findings have important implications for immigration policy and suggests several topics for future research. Perhaps most striking is the finding that immigration and increasing ethnic diversity shifts political support towards the "small government" right-wing block which suggests that immigration may lower the level of redistribution or public spending. Further examation of the effect of immigration on more direct measures of redistribution and public spending thus seems an important topic for future work. 19 Additionally, the finding that immigration-driven increases in ethnic diversity cause a surge in anti-immigrant nationalist sentiments suggests that there may be an upper bound on how much immigration is feasible before anti-immigrant sentiments begin to dominate politically. This seems particularly interesting given the suggestive evidence that the effect on election outcomes is not driven by particular politicial concerns which can be mitigated by policy. Further exploration of the mechanisms linking ethnic diversity and political outcomes, as well as their implications for immigration policy thus also seems like an important topic for future work.
19 Due to institutional details of the Danish setting immigrants have direct budgetary effects on both expenditures and revenues in Danish municipalities, so the Danish context is unfortunately not well suited for a direct examination of the effect of increasing ethnic diversity on the size and structure of public budgets. 1981 1981-2001 1981-2001 1981-2001 1981-2001 1981-2001 % rental, 1981 (1) Supplementary appendix:
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A Details of variables used
Below the detailed construction of each of the main variables is described. Table names refer to the Statistikbanken database unless otherwise noted.
• Percentage non-Danish is constructed as the sum of the indvandrere and efterkommere categories (immigrants and descendants) divided by the total population, based on the BEF3 table.
• Total population is based on the BEF3 table.
• Population density is constructed as total population divided by the mean of the land area 1985-2001 based on the ARE2 table. The mean over the years available is taken because the measured land area actually shows some very small changes (less than 1 square kilometer) over the period despite the fact that municipal borders did not change.
• Mean income is constructed as the mean of total taxable income (SKPLINK )according to the IDA database of SDs individual-level administrative data, deflated to 1980 prices by the chain-linked GDP deflator from the Danish national account, table NAT01.
• Unemployment rate is constructed as the number of unemployed divided by the sum of unemployed and employed, according to the RAS1 table.
• Gini coefficient is computed across households using total taxable income, according to the IDA database of SDs individual-level administrative data.
• Percentage receiving social income transfers is computed using the QSocYd or QBistYd indicators (depending on year) from the IDA database of SDs individual-level administrative data.
• Percentage rental housing is computed as the number of homes rented out divided by the sum of owner occupied homes, rented out homes and non-specified, using the BOL1 table.
• Percentage highrises (1970) is computed as the sum of all highrise homes built before 1970 divided by the sum of all housing built before 1970, in the BOL3 table.
• Percentage seats, left-wing group is computed as the total number of seats won by Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten, Internationalen-SAP, Danmarks Kommunistparti, Arbejderpartiet KAP and Venstresocialisterne divided the total number of seats, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage seats, non-nationalist right-wing group is computed as the total number of seats won by Venstre and Det Konservative Folkeparti divided the total number of seats, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage seats, nationalist group is computed as the total number of seats won by Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti divided the total number of seats, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage seats, "other" group is computed as one minus the percentage of seats won by the traditional left, the three other groups defined above, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X.
• Percentage votes in municipal elections, left-wing group is computed as the total number of votes received by Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten, Internationalen-SAP, Danmarks Kommunistparti, Arbejderpartiet KAP and Venstresocialisterne divided the total number of votes cast, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage votes in municipal elections, non-nationalist right-wing group is computed as the total number of votes received by Venstre and Det Konservative Folkeparti divided the total number of votes cast, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage votes in municipal elections, nationalist group is computed as the total number of votes received by Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti divided the total number of votes cast, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X tables.
• Percentage votes in municipal elections, "other" group is computed as one minus the percentage of votes received by the three other groups defined above, based on the VALG1, VALG9, VALG2 and VALGK3X.
• Percentage votes in national elections, left-wing group is computed as the total number of votes received by Socialdemokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten, Internationalen-SAP, Danmarks Kommunistparti, Arbejderpartiet KAP and Venstresocialisterne divided the total number of votes cast, based on the election accounts of the Danish Ministry of the Interior (downloaded from http://www.im.dk/ ).
• Percentage votes in national elections, non-nationalist right-wing group is computed as the total number of votes received by Venstre and Det Konservative Folkeparti divided the total number of votes cast, based on the election accounts of the Danish Ministry of the Interior (downloaded from http://www.im.dk/ ).
• Percentage votes in national elections, nationalist group is computed as the total number of votes received by Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti divided the total number of votes cast, based on the election accounts of the Danish Ministry of the Interior (downloaded from http://www.im.dk/ ).
• Percentage votes in national elections, "other" group is computed as one minus the percentage of votes received by the three other groups defined above, based on the election accounts of the Danish Ministry of the Interior (downloaded from http://www.im.dk/ ). 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001 . The top-right graph correspond to the left-wing group, the bottom-left to the right-wing group and the bottom right to the the nationalists.
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